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Raymond A. Hinnebusch

POLITICAL RECRUITMENT AND SOCIALIZATION IN SYRIA: THE CASE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY YOUTH FEDERATION

Over the last fifteen years the Syrian Ba'th Party has succeeded–in a country previously known for weak governments and military coups–not only in entrenching a strong relatively stable system of single party rule, but also in launching its own variety of socialist and modernizing revolution. The explanation of this transformation in the nature of Syrian political life is one of the interesting problems of contemporary Syrian and Middle Eastern politics. What accounts for it? This essay will explore one approach to a partial explanation: a study of party recruitment and socialization practices.

At its inception, the architects of the Ba'th regime ostensibly adopted a Leninist model of organization in which the Ba'th, forged into a vanguard party of disciplined, ideologically-committed militants, would be the central pillar of the regime. The rulers of the state would be recruited from the ranks of the party leadership. The party ranks would provide the new rulers with an organized base of politically loyal followers, something which seemed essential for survival in a chronically unstable country like Syria. The bases would also provide the corp of militants which was indispensable to carry out the revolution in the name of which the party had seized power; only through such a network of true believers could the revolutionary center effectively bypass traditional rivals and local influentials to mobilize a base of mass support in the villages and quarters. Although the regime subsequently departed from (and, indeed, never quite reached) the model of pure Leninist party rule, a great deal of time and energy was invested in building a party apparatus. An organization bearing some family resemblence to the Leninist type did emerge in the mid-sixties as a major pillar of the regime.

The creation of such a party organization depended on the entrenchment of a workable system of party role recruitment and socialization. The institutionalization and modernization of political systems is indeed historically associated with the development of systems of political roles differentiated from society and filled by professional political recruitment criteria. In the case of regimes which aspire to make revolutions in their societies, this is especially crucial and

the Leninist model is, of course, originally a response to the particular need of the first modern revolutionary regime to rigorously organize recruitment so as to solve the contradiction between the need for "quality" and "quantity." A revolutionary leadership needs to preserve its decision-making and goal-seeking political-ideological coherence and, thus, its autonomy from the old society by ensuring that those recruited from this traditional, often politically and socially fragmented society identify with the new political order and its revolutionary goals. Only if this is so can the recruits be expected to carry out decisions properly and, eventually, as they move up in the hierarchy, be trusted to participate in making them. This requirement puts the accent on the maximization of ideological "quality."[1] However, the creation of a new political community and the mobilization of revolutionary power obviously requires the linkage of a widening number of actors into the revolutionary system; in other words, a revolution also needs to mobilize quantity if it is to succeed. Excessively restrictive or controlled recruitment may isolate the regime and deprive it of the ability to mobilize support, while unrestricted recruitment without sufficient socialization could lead to dilution of the revolutionary drive and to the reproduction inside the regime of the various social, cultural, and political cleavages and interests of the old society. The Leninist recruitment formula, with its rigorous selection criteria, long periods of candidacy and indoctrination, graded ranks of political consciousness, combined with extensive mass organization is well designed, theoretically at least, to solve the dilemma of ideological commitment and broad mass recruitment. Even after revolutionary ardor has cooled or after the revolution has become institutionalized, such recruitment practices, though perhaps less rigorously applied, often continue to be useful in sustaining a base of politically loyal followers ready to accept orders.

This study will examine the results of the Syrian effort to establish recruitment practices compatable with the creation of a revolutionary party. It goes without saying, of course, that the ultimate consequences of the transfer of a model of political organization designed in one culture and set of circumstances to another is unpredictable. In the case of the Ba'th, the original ideal intention to create a Leninist party was indeed eventually altered by a variety of other, divergent motivations brought to the enterprise by those engaged. While a full discussion of this evolution of the Ba'th cannot be attempted here, the development of recruitment practices both reflects broader developments and is part of their explanation. An effort will be made here to measure actual recruitment practices against the ideal which would have to be approached were a purely Leninist type regime to have been established, to give some explanations for departures from the ideal, and to suggest some of their consequences. In Section I, a formal structural model of the system is sketched and an effort made to estimate the actual relevance of the ideal norms. In Section II, the performance of the structure is explored through a statistical analysis of a sample survey of the background and attitudes of recruits to the Revolutionary Youth Federation, the party's specialized recruitment-socialization infrastructure. Finally, some conclusions are offered.

A MODEL OF RECRUITMENT IN THE BA'TH REGIME[2]

In the Ba'th recruitment system, the single party organization has been officially–and substantially in practice–the dominant recruitment channel to important political roles in government, the bureaucracy, the public sector and the army.[3] Formally, the party serves as a mechanism to attract, prepare, and control the upward mobility of personnel so as to maximize the ideological commitments and record of partisan service of those recruited to these roles. Conversely, it is supposed to exclude persons lacking commitment and service from roles and restrict the use of resources other than these in the competition for roles.

This mechanism is constituted, firstly, of an interface with society which aims to activate and attract recruits from broad sectors of society. Since the party came to power, a primary task of the party apparatus has been to extend its infrastructure[4] into the sectors of society considered the natural base of the revolution, namely, the workers, peasants, "revolutionary intellectuals," small tradesmen, and soldiers.[5] Toward this end, basic level party cells have been established in factories, villages, neighborhoods, schools, and professional organizations as interface structures charged with recruitment.[6] As a part of this undertaking, every party member has been expected to cultivate a "friend" as a potential candidate for membership.[7]

Secondly, the mechanism is supposed to perform as a device for the selection and preparation of members. In terms of selection, party rules indicate that during its early years in power (1963–66), when a premium was put on expansion, the only essential requirement for eligibility was belief in the party's program and the only criterion of disqualification, membership in an opposing political group.[8] In 1966, with the radicalization of the regime, a new and important selection criterion was introduced, that of class origin, with those classes judged "hostile to the party's goals" being excluded.[9] In addition to these criteria, all recruits had always to be recommended by two party members who could testify to their suitability. Before promotion to full membership, they had to be approved by their basic level leaders, and by a higher-level screening committee.[10] As for preparation, all members spend a number of years in socialization cells (2–2½ years at least) during which they engage in study and do lesser political tasks before taking a test for promotion to full membership. It does seem that promotion to full status, through a series of stages, has, at least for periods such as that of 1966–70, been fairly rigorously controlled.[11] Continuous socialization is provided for full members in regular weekly meetings under the supervision of the Bureau of Cultural Affairs and Party Preparation. The bureau also runs a system of party schools for senior party cadres.[12]

Thirdly, the mechanism is designed to control upward mobility by formulae which have variously combined phased, limited-franchise elections, appointments, and higher-level powers of purge. From 1963–71, elections were held in a series of ascending stages in which the bases elected congresses, which, in

turn, elected higher-level congresses and leadership organs. In 1971, this pattern was altered when lower leadership organs became appointive, while central congresses were elected directly from the base level and the supreme organs elected from these. While the impact of these elections on mobility appears to be more than negligible, it is limited and counterbalanced by various restrictions on participation and powers of control wielded by the central leadership. Firstly voting rights are not enjoyed by members in the early stages of preparation, and the right to stand for elections is confined to full members who have completed the preparation period.[13] In addition, candidates for election to various leadership organs must have been members for requisite periods, for example three years for basic level leadership organs and ten years for the Regional (Syrian) Command.[14] Finally, the center wields extensive powers to dissolve lower-level leadership organs and call for new elections,[15] to discipline and purge members for "deviation" from party goals or bad conduct, and in "emergencies," to suspend the rules and review all memberships.[16]

To the extent this system is actually operative, it should be able to channel broad but ideologically suitable recruitment flows into the system. The evidence does suggest that the system is operative as regards the quantitative dimension of recruitment. There is little doubt but that the infrastructure itself has been emplaced in fairly uniform fashion throughout the country. Furthermore most historical and social background evidence suggests that the actual base of the regime is among the lower middle and lower classes, particularly among rurals. Data on membership figures, while not fully conclusive, do suggest that the regime has mobilized a sizable proportion of this potential base. By the 1970s, the party organization appeared to have a membership of more than 100,000–constituting about 4 percent of the adult population.[17] This means the party has at its disposal about one in every thirteen adult males.[18] One indicator of the regime's apparent satisfaction with the rate of numerical recruitment is that the policy of encouraging each member to cultivate a recruit has been abandoned.[19] Thus the infrastructure does seem to have enabled the regime to reach out and greatly expand the scope of participation in the recruitment pool to include large numbers of persons from previously relatively inactive population groups. By providing through its infrastructure access to the ladder of mobility for many persons not particularly well placed, by replacing wealth and social status by political service and commitment as the main resources for acquiring power, and by offering people of modest means the chance to pursue a political career, and "live off politics," the system increases both the necessary resources and the incentives for expanded mass participation. Thus it can give itself roots in mass society and mobilize numbers in its service.

As regards the "qualitative" dimension, the evidence is far more ambiguous. The selection screens, the system of continuous socialization, and restricted candidacy in elections should help ensure that those who move into and up in the system have been exposed to indoctrination and have rendered service to the party over a protracted period. These mechanisms probably have been sufficiently operative to exclude opponents and generate a common, if diffuse, po-

litical orientation. The system has probably worked well enough to neutralize the use of such resources as wealth and status in the recruitment process. Indeed, the system erects a barrier against the old elite of wealth and status overthrown by the Ba'th, preventing them from using these resources to regain their old positions–as some might be able to do in a more open, liberal system.

There is, however, plenty of evidence that the actual operationalization of the formal system has encountered serious problems. Many of these problems can be traced to the circumstances under which the party came to power. It was in organizational disarray and its membership was scattered; yet, faced with strong challenges to its rule, it had to rapidly reconstruct and expand the organization. In this expansion, recruitment norms were often ignored or even superceded by particularistic ties such as friendship, kinship and sectarian solidarity.[20] Required preparation periods were sometimes telescoped and some persons achieved very rapid mobility in the party–especially if they found a patron in higher places.[21] The effect of these "malpractices" on regime coherence was mitigated by the fact that many of those recruited in this fashion were old members returning to the party, but this formative experience nevertheless left a permanent mark on the "quality" of the membership. Also important was the fact that at the time of the seizure of power–and indeed for years afterward –party leaders were divided and could not readily use the recruitment mechanism to build a unified organization around a clear ideology. This of course was due to the originally rather diffuse ideology of the party which could accomodate a variety of different political trends and to the constant process of mutation the party underwent under the pressure of events. Able to agree only partially on regime goals, party leaders could agree only partially on the criteria of membership and promotion.[22] Further, as rival leaders and coalitions had to seek support at the bases for their claims to leadership and the policies they represented, it became important for them to bring followers into the party and secure positions for them, while minimizing the ability of opponents to do so. A characteristic way of building a support base was for a local or regional leader to bring as many followers as possible into the local organization, hoping to build a base of power sufficient to catapult him into national prominence. On the other hand, it was not uncommon for leaders at the center to use their powers over lower levels to build local support bases, or to pick protégés from lower levels and try to have them inserted in higher positions, thus building a network of support in important places. Sometimes they used their powers of purge against each others' followers or dissolved lower leadership bodies controlled by opponents in order to get supporters elected in their place. In these rivalries, local, sectarian, kinship and personal ties between leaders and followers often became very important in recruitment or in the formation of electoral and patron-client-like coalitions for support or upward mobility. On two major and several minor occassions rival leaders even used their support in the military party organization or the security police to purge and fill political roles through violence or the threat of it. Although ideology–or at least alternative policies–played a critical role in these conflicts, they nevertheless undermined the efficiency of the formal mechanisms designed to maximize recruitment ac-

cording to ideological principles. In the race to insert one's supporters in party organs, abstract definitions of ideological commitment, difficult to measure in any case, were sometimes lost sight of. Further, factional rivalry deprived the party over extended periods of the unified leadership necessary to properly build a pool of highly motivated, disciplined cadres and weed out unsuitable elements; for example, if a member was disciplined by one leadership faction for bad behavior he might seek and find protection with a rival faction. In periods of consolidation and relative leadership unity it was possible to correct some of the most damaging abuses in the system. Thus in the three years (1966–68) when radical leaders wielded undisputed control, the effort to shape the party along Leninist lines did make some headway. But in late 1968 factional conflict erupted again and began to undo most of this work.

Another consequence of factional conflict for the political-ideological "quality" of the membership followed from the fact that after the victory of a particular leadership faction in the power struggle, large numbers of the followers of the defeated faction would either be purged or leave the party voluntarily to be replaced by newcomers. Inevitably the proportion of "old" members with long commitment to the party and its ideology suffered attrition, while waves of untested novitiates flooded in. Many of the latter must have been attracted by the career benefits and other privileges of membership in a ruling party.

Another factor which probably helps explain the modest results of the effort to entrench Leninist recruitment rules is the great difficulty of measuring political-ideological commitment. Length of service seems to be one of the few indicators the party could rely upon, but this hardly measures intensity. In the case of other Leninist experiments, the party was typically constructed slowly during periods of social conflict and struggle for power when membership entailed real risks and when there were many opportunities to demonstrate commitment. Membership in the Ba'th, however, never involved great risks, and after the seizure of power, when the party was reconstructing itself along ostensibly Leninist lines, rewards must have far outweighed risks. When the measurement of ideological purity is so elusive, other types of "qualifications"–friendships, personal and sectarian loyalties, kinship–are bound to assume important proportions. It may very well be that a true Leninist party cannot be built subsequent to the seizure of power.

The period following the emergence of Hafiz al-Asad as leader of a party faction opposed to the radical leadership marked the beginning of a yet more serious deviation from the Leninist model. Gradually Asad withdrew the military party organization from the control of the political leadership of the party and in recruitment to military commands increased weight was given to professional qualifications at the expense of political ones. The seizure of sole power by Asad in a coup d'etat in late 1970 not only represented a dramatic "bypassing" of recruitment rules, but also signalled the emergence of a more pragmatic, less ideological leadership, far less concerned with the forging of a revolutionary party-state than with the consolidation of the regime and the creation of national unity. Subsequent recruitment policy departed in two directions. On the one hand expansion of the party bases was accelerated and waiting periods

reduced in order to widen the support base of the new leaders and dilute the influence of the deposed radicals. At the same time some alternative recruitment paths to top positions bypassing the party were opened up–chiefly through the National Progressive Front, or on grounds of professional qualifications. Two other power centers, a new Presidential establishment-entourage and the security services, both recruited on the basis of personal loyalty to the President, took on increasing importance. Despite all this, the party remained the largest and most institutionalized recruitment pathway. Party membership and connections were still critical for reaching the inner circles of power; at the middle and lower levels of the regime, the role of the party seemed relatively undiminished.

The analysis which has preceded has drawn largely on structural and historical kinds of evidence; in the following pages a statistical behavioral approach will be brought to bear on the subject.

THE REVOLUTIONARY YOUTH FEDERATION AS RECRUITMENT/SOCIALIZATION INFRASTRUCTURE: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF RECRUITMENT PRACTICES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

An important development, aimed at improving the performance of the recruitment function, was the establishment of the party youth auxillary, the Revolutionary Youth Federation (*Ittiḥâd ash-Shebîbe ath-Thawrî*) as a specialized recruitment infrastructure. The organization was probably intended to help insulate recruitment from the disruptive effects of factional conflict. Mainly, however, it was designed to enable the regime to further expand, deepen, and regulate recruitment flows and to tap potential recruits while they were still in the stage of political attitude formation. As it developed, the organization was to penetrate into the schools, villages and factories in uniform fashion to prepare large numbers of future Ba'thists needed to sustain the system, and in practice, it appears to have made considerable headway in this.[23]

The *Shebîbe* claims to seek a broad mass recruitment and is officially open to all except those whose "origins and political associations are incompatable with its goals "–a phrase evidently meant to exclude the sons of the former ruling class and to prevent the infiltration of rival political elements such as the Ikhwân.[24] To attract youth the organization makes ideological appeals, invoking the symbols of nationalism, socialism and progress, while also offering cultural, social and sports activities. It offers the chance for political and other types of careers since those who perform best for the organization are promised priority of access to schools, scholarships, state jobs and the military academy.[25] By the 1970s the organization seemed to be having no difficulty attracting members, and had established its branches across the country.[26]

According to organization literature, the Shebîbe is a "school of struggle in which the new generation encounters the basics of nationalist and socialist education" and an "anteroom to the field of struggle represented by the party." Members' duties include "struggle against feudal and bourgeois mentalities," and the development of skills and professions to raise production.[27] Member-

TABLE I *Social composition of recruits: I*[31]

Father's occupation	Percent of sample	Estimated percent of population
Upper and middle classes		
Larger merchant-employers	5.2	
Landowner-employers	3.4	
Total	8.6	2
Lower middle classes		
Employees, small professions	15.5	
Small merchants and artisans	17.2	
Soldiers	17.2	
Total	49.9	18
Lower classes		
Peasant small-holders	13.8	
Workers	15.5	
Peasant non-holders (landless)	12.1	
Total	41.4	80

ship seems to offer aspiring young politicians the opportunity to launch their careers, and through it they will absorb the political culture of the regime. They learn the methods of political procedure, such as candidacy, voting, discussion, criticism coalition-formation.[28] At higher levels of the organization, the member experiences a gradual integration into the party itself. The organization is also supposed to instill a sense of citizenship and given members experience in cooperation on an organized scale; thus they attend summer camps for citizenship training, participate in development projects such as road building, tree-planting, giving literacy courses, and they undertake training in arms. The organization stages cultural fairs with strong patriotic themes. Some members are supposed to be learning the skills of "self-management" by serving on the administrative boards of schools. But in addition to the virtues and methods of participation, the members also learn the realities of control from above and are, it would seem, shaped according to the political purposes of the party leadership.[29]

An effort will be made in the following pages to assess the performance of the Youth Union recruitment structure through an analysis of a survey sample tapping the social origins, attitudes and motivations of organization members. The analysis can probably be taken as shedding some light on the performance of recruitment and socialization in the party itself and should have bearing as regards the future composition of the party. First, an examination will be made of the social groups in the sample in a search for further evidence regarding the extent of infrastructural penetration of society and quantitative recruitment performance. Second, an examination will be made of attitudes and motivations in an effort to assess the effectiveness of the infrastructure in selecting and preparing potential role-holders imbued with regime ideology and moti-

TABLE 2 *Social composition of recruits: II*[33]

Sectors	Sample percent	Population percent
Student/non-student	78.8/21.1	NA
Religious practitioners/non-practitioners	65/35	?
Military/civilian	17.5/82.5	?
Urban/rural occupation	70.7/29.3	57/43
Ba'th families/non-Ba'th families	49.2/50.8	4/96

vated to serve its goals. Finally, an analysis of the comparative characteristics of members at various levels of the organization may yield some insights into the workings of the mobility mechanism.[30]

The Social Composition of Recruits

The social composition of the sample, broken down in Tables 1 and 2, suggests a number of trends and patterns. First, the results are evidence that the regime is successfully recruiting from all social strata, and that no stratum is being systematically excluded or withholding itself from participation. It also suggests that the recruitment infrastructure is reaching relatively deeply into the stratification system to recruit from the lower strata. This does seem to represent a significant transformation of political recruitment in Syria: previous to the revolution, the lower command of social resources and skills, and the higher costs of participation for lower class persons resulted in their virtual exclusion from leadership recruitment pools, while the monopolistic command of economic resources and education by higher class persons permitted them to dominate politics. This effect is apparently being partly overcome in Syria through the use of recruitment infrastructures aimed to systematically activate deprived strata while neutralizing the ability of upper strata to translate disproportionate command of social resources into disproportionate political power. These figures support what more impressionistic evidence has led other observers to suggest, that the Ba'th regime is an alliance of the "petty bourgeoisie" and the "masses."[32]

The data also suggests efforts to bridge the urban-rural gap so typical of political participation in developing countries. As Table 2 indicates, rurals constitute 30 percent of the sample, while in the district from which the sample was taken they constitute about 43 percent of the total population. This may reflect the expansion of opportunities for rural persons made possible by the ascension of a rural-based elite to power.

The large percentage of religious practitioners in the sample is suggestive evidence that, despite the occasional ability of traditional religious leaders to mobilize religious-based opposition to the "godless" Ba'th regime, many religiously pious persons do not perceive a contradiction between the regime and their religion. This is critical in a country where Islam remains very influential among the masses–the group–which the regime regards as its base of power and beneficiary of its revolution.

TABLE 3 *Social breakdown of recruits (in percent)*

Strata	Ba'th family	Non-Ba'th family
Upper	12.0	8.4
Middle	56.0	49.4
Lower	32.0	42.4

Finally, the distribution of recruitment between Ba'th and non-Ba'th families probably reflects the importance of personal relations in recruitment, and also the effects of family socialization in spurring a higher level of recruitment from Ba'th families than from the population as a whole. This data also suggests however, that the regime is reaching beyond its original base in the recruitment process, and that it is not attempting to constitute itself as an exclusivistic and particularistic in-group based on family and personal connections. If we let those from Ba'th families serve as a reflection of the regime's original social base, and recruits from non-Ba'th families as indicators of the direction of new recruitment, we find, on the contrary, that the regime seems to be continuing the widening of recruitment to include more lower-strata persons.

Attitudinal Composition

In order to tap the attitudes of recruitees on a number of issues presently salient for Syrians (and also important in regime ideology), the questions detailed in Table 4 pertaining to nationalism, socialism, and secularism, were asked of respondants.

These responses indicate a fairly high level of consensus on questions connected with nationalism (1–2), and socialism (3–5). However, on questions 6–9, agreement is at a much lower level. On the question of the inheritance of property, there is a cleavage between those who would permit the inheritance of a "moderate" amount and those who would permit little or none, which may reflect the persistent tension in Ba'thist politics between "moderate" and "radical" socialists. Question 7 may also touch on this conflict, that is, on the cleavage between those preferring radical social revolution in the Middle East, combining revolution against the Arab monarchs and a "People's War of Liberation" against Israel as against those who desire to form a common Arab front including Arab monarchs against Israel. The cleavages on question 8 and 9 touch on the issue of secularism, on what role religious law should play in social life, or, more generally, the perception of the social world as God-given or man-made. This issue is unquestionably a explosive one in Syrian society, and these data indicate it has penetrated into the regime itself.

In order to test the impact of social differences on the attitudinal pattern, cross-tabulations were run between the social categories and four indices of attitudinal orientation derived from the questions.[34] The results show *class* to be the most important predictor of attitude variation. The lower classes exhibit a somewhat higher intensity of general ideological orientation than the middle

TABLE 4 *Attitudes of recruits (in percent)*

1. Do you feel it would be justifiable for Syria to restrict Palestinian commando activity from bases in Syria if the cost from Israeli reprisals became too high?		
Yes: 6.2	Sometimes: 10.6	No: 83.1
2. Should Syria refuse to buy goods from nations which heavily support Israel, even if this means Syrians must do without or pay higher prices for some goods?		
Yes: 86.1	Sometimes: 6.2	No: 7.7
3. Do you think the government should ensure that the national resources are distributed evenly, even if this means taking strong measures against the rich?		
Yes: 95.4	Sometimes: 3.1	No: 1.5
4. Should the private sector be left to develop itself freely?		
Yes: 6.1	Sometimes: 15.2	No: 78.8
5. Should the government supervise the private sector?		
Yes: 81.5	Sometimes: 12.3	No: 6.2
6. How much property should people be allowed to inherit?		
Any Amount: 4.8	Moderate: 44.4	Little/None: 50.8
7. Should Syria co-operate with the Arab monarchies?		
Yes: 40.9	Sometimes: 47	No: 12.1
8. What should be the role of the Quran and Sharia in legislation?		
Much: 19.7	Some: 44.3	None: 36.1
9. Some say that good results come from the expenditure of effort, while some believe it depends on the will of God. With which opinion do you agree?		
Effort: 52.4	Don't Know: 27	Will of God: 20.6

strata, and considerably more than the upper strata (G = .56). In nationalist orientation, the middle and lower strata score about the same, while the upper strata are again lower in intensity. (G = .58 when the two lower classes are compared with the upper). Similarly, on socialist issues, the higher the strata, the lower the positive orientation (G = .40). On the question of secularism, however, there is little variation between strata.[35] (See Table 5.)

Another important predictor of attitudes was the urban-rural dichotomy. Rural occupations seem much more highly associated with nationalist attitudes than urban ones, although statistically the data are only significant at the .10 level (G = .77). Rurals also tend to express a higher general ideological orientation than city folk. While this relationship may partly reflect class differences since persons with rural occupations tend to be of lower class (G = .71), the urban-rural dichotomy still appears to be a better predictor of nationalism than is class.

A third important factor in attitude variation is religious practice; those who observe Ramadan tending to have a lower ideological orientation (G = .69, 10 percent chance of error), to be less socialist oriented, and, of course, to be less secular (G = .48), but not less nationalist.

Another factor which has a persistent, though less heavy impact on attitudes is Ba'thist family origin, an indication of the influence of family socialization;

TABLE 5 *Attitudinal orientation (in percent)*

	Ideological orientation			Socialist orientation		
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
Upper	00.0	00.0	100.0	33.0	50.0	18.0
Middle	28.6	32.1	39.3	78.0	17.0	04.0
Lower	42.9	38.1	19.0	81.0	14.0	04.0
	Nationalist orientation			Secularist orientation		
	High	Low		High	Medium	Low
Upper	50.0	50.0		20.0	40.0	40.0
Middle	81.5	18.5		26.0	67.0	07.0
Lower	76.2	23.0		18.0	65.0	18.0

those from such families reveal a higher orientation to ideology on all issue clusters, especially socialism (G = .59).

The only other background factor which seems to have any impact on attitudes is the student/non-student dichotomy, with students being perhaps more oriented to socialism (G = .46, 10 percent chance of error). The lack of important differences between recruits from military and civilian families probably reflects the lack of a differentiated military subculture in Syria, where the army has deep roots in the population. It is worth noting that none of these findings contradict the historical record: in particular, the receptivity of the rural lower middle and lower strata to Ba'thi ideas has always been marked.

These data suggest a number of propositions about the performance of the recruitment system. First, it seems likely that the responses reflect a much higher level of ideological consensus on the issues tapped than would be found in the general population. In this regard, it is notable that even among the social group which seems least disposed to Ba'thist ideology, the upper class, responses are far from uniformly deviant from the Ba'thist norm. In Table 6, the percentage picking the modal choice is compared with the percentage of upper class persons picking this choice. Most striking is the willingness of upper class respondents to say that the government should distribute the wealth equally even if this means taking strong measures against the rich, an attitude in apparent contradiction to the interests of this social group. At a minimum, the recruitment/socialization system does seem to be having some impact in creating a political consensus in recruits from a socially and politically diverse population.

A second observation is that the drive of the regime to expand the scope of participation, recruiting from lower strata and from rural areas seems to be a productive strategy, as these sectors seem to combine numbers with apparently higher ideological commitments. This strategy allows the regime to recruit an expanding number of persons into the system who seem disposed to share its goals–the formula for the mobilization of power. On the other hand, the relatively low ideological commitments of upper class recruitees indicates the util-

TABLE 6 *Attitudinal comparison (in percent)*

Question	Sample modal choice	Upper class choice
1. Restrict fedayeen	83.1	67.0
2. Boycott west	86.1	50.0
3. Government distribute wealth	95.4	100.0
4. Private sector left free	78.8	33.0

ity, from the point of view of the regime, of depriving these groups of the ability to translate their greater control of wealth and status into a greater control of political power. (Yet they are not, in fact, being excluded from participation, and can acquire political careers on the same terms as other persons.) It seems likely that the higher ideological commitments expressed by lower class and rural groups are not simply a reflection of a natural class consciousness, but that they reflect the impact of the drive of the regime to extend its political infrastructure into the mass and rural sectors and to mobilize these groups as a base of power. Although, in fact, these groups may have a greater orientation to nationalist and egalitarian symbols, regardless of mobilization, their cultural deprivation typically retards the activation of such orientations unless they are politically mobilized. The regime does seem to be having considerable success in using this mobilizational strategy to combine the goal of maintaining regime coherence with that of expanding recruitment.[36]

Despite these apparent successes, our data seem also to identify some important points of weakness. The cleavage over degrees of social and nationalist radicalism represents a persistent source of tension inside the regime, despite the widely held consensus on some mixture of socialism and nationalism. It has been a continuing source of elite conflict which has erupted into major regime convulsions twice since the Revolution, and has considerably reduced the level of regime performance. Our data offer no clear evidence that the recruitment mechanisms are doing much to ease the cleavage by inculcating a consensus into new recruits.

The second cleavage indicated by the data, over the issue of secularism, is also a danger for the regime. For the most part, the Ba'thist elite is secular in outlook, and the minorities who represent a strong component of the regime have a clear stake in a secular state. Yet the majority of the population still exhibits certain nonsecular attitudes. Our data indicate that this has not led to the isolation of the regime; instead the contradiction has penetrated into the regime. This would seem to be inevitable, for, as long as the elite seeks a strong mass base, it cannot restrict recruitment to secular-minded persons; in our sample 61 percent of the lower strata expected some role for Islam in the state. Furthermore, the proportion of religious practitioners in the recruitment pool may even be increasing; our data indicate that while earlier recruits were fairly evenly divided between practitioners and non-practitioners, more recent groups are dominated by the practitioners in a 70–30 ratio. The strategy of the regime has increasingly been to back away from open and aggressive secu-

larism, trying to blunt the issue, while its enemies try to sharpen and use the issue against it. The power of the issue is reflected in the fact that it has been a factor in the three major revolts the opposition has been able to stage since the revolution, and each time it has created strains inside the regime itself. On the other hand, the potential for mitigating the cleavage is also indicated by the data. 44.3 percent of respondents adopt a centrist position, expecting only "some" role for Islam in the state, and 70 percent of religious practitioners accept this position. Also, our sample indicates higher education levels are associated with rising secularism, suggesting that this may be a growing trend. For the moment, however, recruitment/socialization mechanisms are having only modest success in dealing with the problem.

Finally, an important qualification of the previous assessment of the performance of the recruitment-socialization system needs to be made. An interesting problem is raised by the findings and the assumptions underlying the analysis. Responses have been "measured" for Ba'thi ideological "correctness" by a standard generated from traditional party postures; it has also been assumed throughout that the system is indeed designed, at least in part, to maximize this ideological "correctness" and that its success or failure can be evaluated on these grounds. Evidence has been offered that this probably was an important motivation at the inception of the regime. But in recent years a tendency by the Ba'th leadership to depart from traditional postures has become more marked. The regime has become notably less militant in its defense of the Palestinian revolution, has initiated an economic liberalization which significantly alters the socialist model of the first decade of the regime, and has increasingly adopted nonsecular religious-laden symbolism in its public postures. Given this, it may be false to assume that the Ba'th leadership would today consider inculcation of traditional Ba'thi ideology as necessarily functional for its own goal attainment, because such a rigorous socialization might result in constraints on its own freedom of action. The ostensibly very militant responses of the sample as regards the Palestinian issue may no longer be wholly congruent with leadership goals. Of course, we cannot know exactly how to take these responses. To the extent they reflect strongly held preferences, it may mean that socialization policy is lagging behind changes in goal-orientation at the top and may be somewhat dysfunctional from the point of view of the leadership. If they represent merely what respondants take to be the ideologically correct responses expected of them by their leaders, it may reflect an inefficiency in transmitting cues from top to base, but would not seem to be a serious threat to the leadership. On the basis of our data alone, there is no way to judge which is the case. However, it is no longer a secret that top leaders have recently regarded the more militant postures of the bases as a constraint–but one which they have not hesitated to override when they felt it necessary.

Recruitment Motivations

Attempts to understand why persons join political movements, and the consequences of these motivations on the movement, may focus on two different

TABLE 7 *Reasons for joining organization (in percent)*

1. Imperialism, Zionism, Palestine, 1967 war, occupation of Syrian territory	32.2
2. Arab unity aspirations or movements	6.4
3. Class struggle, revolution, egalitarianism	17.0
4. Need for development, backwardness of country	14.9
5. Nothing recalled	25.5

levels. The first is the "macro-level", the national, public-level events or circumstances which may impinge on the actor; the study of these social and political forces which "push" persons to join is a reflection of the regimes' roots in socio-political life. The second level is the "micro-level" or more personal, private satisfaction derived from or expected to follow from political participation; every recruitment system must provide rewards of some kind to enlist energies, and the particular way in which it exercises this pull on recruits will have important consequences.

This study begins exploration of recruitment motivations by focusing on the role of macro-level phenomena in activating the political energies of participants. Among the most powerful of such factors must be counted upheavals in social structure, encounters with foreign societies, and the expansion of resources and opportunity. In Syria, all these factors have been salient and the Ba'th Party has played important roles in all of them. In order to gauge these forces and their impact on the Ba'th recruitment drive, respondents were asked in an open-ended question, if they could recall events in the life of the nation which led them to join the organization. Responses were distributed in the categories indicated in Table 7.

Concern with nationalist issues seems to be the most weighty factor, reflecting the fact that the national struggle with "imperialism" and Zionism has been virtually uninterrupted since the early Arab Nationalist movement during World War I. Since its rise, the Ba'th has been responsible for giving a greater intensity to nationalist themes, and has taken a radical nationalist stance which seems congruent with Syrian popular sentiments. Nationalism represents a powerful cluster of symbols which strike a response in modern and traditional, ideologue, careerist, and "personalist." However, a nationalist strategy of mobilization is a two-edged sword, and a regime which employs it may be held responsible for nationalist reversals. The failure of the Ba'th regime in the 1967 war must have severely damaged its ability to invoke nationalist appeals. However, our responses suggest that, though the regime may have suffered among groups most aware of its poor performance, it has not generally been discredited on that basis among many others. On the contrary, the results are evidence that the Israeli occupation of Quneitra has acted as a catalyst, sparking a renewal of national arousal, spurring national solidarity and even a certain intensification of adhesion to the regime. Of the 21 nationalist citations, 12 ex-

plicitly mention the 1967 war. Here are some examples:

"the war of 1967 pushed me to join."
"because of the situation in the country which is bitter with trouble from the Zionists . . ."
"in this difficult stage of the national existence, there are dangers we must face up to . . ."
"Israeli seizure of Arab land, especially Jerusalem . . ."
"to explain the Arab cause and the brutality of imperialism . . ."
"because I am an Arab and feel the sentiment of the Arabs to realize the goals of their nation, I want the Arabs to recover their worth through solidarity in these difficult circumstances . . ."

One citation indicates the regimes's creditable performance in the 1973 war has increased its popular nationalist standing:

"I joined because of the war of 1967 when the Zionists took the land of our people, and the war of October when the Arab people won against the Zionists; whereas before they said "we will always win," now we let them know differently."

The cross-tabulation of recruitment occasions with the various social categories further highlights the saliency of nationalist concern, and its importance as an accelerating activator of recruitment. Those from non-Ba'th families–more recent adherents to the regime–cite a nationalist occasion of recruitment 60.7 percent of the time, while those from Ba'th families cite it only 39 percent. The latter refer to class and revolution 85.7 percent of the time, while those from non-Ba'th families do so only 14.3 percent. Thus, the nationalist issue seems to be a major factor in recruitment among a more recent group of persons not previously closely associated with the regime. This view is supported by the fact that of all those brought into the organization by friends–indicating a closer connection to the Ba'th–only 30 percent cite a nationalist occasion, while 67 percent of those *self*-activated cite nationalism. Another interesting finding is that 55 percent of rurals cite a nationalist occasion, while only 21 percent of urbanites do so. Combined with our previous discovery of intense nationalist attitudes among rurals, support is lent to the proposition that nationalism is serving as a critical key to peasant mobilization and elite penetration of the Syrian countryside. The nationalism of the peasantry, and the rural intellectuals and army officers derived from that stratum would seem to be a mainstay of the regime and source of its power.

One interesting additional observation indicated by the data is the much reduced saliency of the notion of Arab unity as a component of nationalist concern. This is certainly congruent with the shift in nationalist focus, since the failure of the UAR and the 1963 Tripartite unity talks, toward the problem of Palestine and then that of the occupied territories.

References to class, egalitarianism, and social revolution represent another major category of responses:

"the organization helps all people without differences between them."
"I am in the poor class and class divisions play a big role in the backwardness of our country."

TABLE 8 *Responses to what would be missed by leaving the organization (in percent)*

1. Serving the goals of the nation or people, working for, fulfilling tasks for the country; duty; responsibility to country, people.	46
2. Participation, integration into social and political stream of events, and national affairs; relations with comrades, comradeship for common goals, sense of self-identity, honor.	42
3. Nothing indicated.	12

"the revolutionary transformation which changed the life of the working class from the least to the best."

These responses reflect the fact that since independence the country has experienced considerable social conflict and intense debate over the direction in which the country should go, and that since 1963 the Ba'th has carried out a major revolution. The changes in social structure brought by the revolution have opened up new opportunities for lower class persons and have disrupted the old stable structure of social status. These changes, combined with the diffusion of an egalitarian ideology, seem to have been potent recruitment activators. They tap the ideological demand for justice, and the careerist demand for a widening of opportunity and access to income, status and power.

Another important activating factor is the symbolism and substance of "development," and "modernization," with their promises of modern careers, expanding economic prosperity and national strength. This promise seems to appeal strongly to young people who are preparing for careers, and who are also sensitive to the notion that their country is backward. Through participation, they feel they can contribute to modernization, while finding relief from the constrictions imposed by traditional society. A number of female recruits who cite the drive for cultural development as an occasion of recruitment make explicit the linkage of their personal condition to development: they seek escape from and overthrow of the restrictive social traditions which women in villages and small towns face, and they see this personal liberation attainable in the context of the cultural development of their society:

"I joined in opposition to the backwardness of society which segregates by sex; I joined to prove that mingling gives the best work results and we are on the way to proving that."

A second aim of the investigation of recruitment motivations was to identify at the micro-level more personal satisfactions involved in recruitment, that is, how recruitees made the link between their personal needs and the collective macro-level. First, an open-ended question queried respondents as to the things they would miss if they left the organization. Responses were distributed in the broad categories detailed in Table 8. These responses suggest that two important factors in explaining recruitment were the satisfactions recruitees derived from working for public goals, and from a feeling of participation or integration into a group—what might be called "solidarity rewards."

Secondly, in a further effort to identify a *typology* of linkages made by recruits between their personal needs and the macro-level, respondents were

TABLE 9 *Motivations for belonging to organization*

Statement	Number of picks
1. I have friends in the party	12
2. I want to make political work my profession	12
3. I wanted to be near those doing important things	42
4. There were things wrong with the country which angered me which I wanted to change	36
5. Gives me a feeling of recognition in my village	36
6. Helps me fulfill my sense of community duty	55
7. I wanted to work for goals and programs important to the country	32
8. I felt admiration for a party leader	8
9. People I trusted were party members	17
10. It was a good opportunity to gain new experience and meet new people	19
11. My family was long in politics, so naturally I am	2
12. I wanted to help make the country strong	32

asked to pick 5 statements from the set of 12 in Table 9 which best corresponded to their motivations.

Each of these twelve items was meant to correspond to one of three theoretical motivation types which, it was thought, would be the most characteristic kinds in the Syrian case. These motivations were: 1) ideological, which, it was supposed, would be important in a revolutionary regime (items 4, 6, 7, 12) 2) "careerism," a motivation which could be expected in a country where a great portion of available opportunities are politically controlled (items 2, 3, 5, 10) and 3) "personalism" or the connective tissue of traditional politics which, it was supposed, would to some degree persist (items 1, 8, 9, 11). A correlation analysis was run on the picks of respondents in order to determine to what extent, if at all, the items would cluster according to the theoretical typology. In part, as Table 10 indicates, they do cluster as expected, but important deviations are also indicated, as some items fail to follow the original design.[37] In arriving at a tentative typology, therefore, a number of untidy compromises had to be made between the theoretical and statistical clusters, as will be explained below. Once the clusters were identified, each respondent was given a score for each cluster type.[38] Then, in order to explore the characteristics associated with each type, these scores were cross-tabulated with attitudinal scales, social background variables, and two semi-behavioral scales measuring "participation level" and "political efficacy."[39] Below, each cluster type is examined in turn in an effort to justify the typology and explore its meaning.

Type 1: Ideological Motivation. This motivation type is composed by the clustering of the three following items: 4) There were things wrong with the country which angered me which I wanted to change, 7) I wanted to work for goals and programs important for the country, 12) I wanted to help make the country strong. This is a weak cluster statistically and item 4 fits quite badly with the other items. Nonetheless, it was decided to preserve the cluster as logically and conceptually the items seemed to fit best together. It seems likely that item 4

TABLE 10 *Correlation analysis of responses in Table 9 (Pearson's r's)*

4	7	12	2	3	1	5	6	8	9	10	
	−12	+05	+02	−05	+07	−35	+07	+02	−15	−15	4
		+14	−30	−28	−18	−14	−07	−01	−06	00	7
			−30	−00	−10	−21	−17	−31	−28	+07	12
				+17	+04	−04	−15	−08	+12	−17	2
					+15	−16	−15	−26	−45	−08	3
						−09	−29	−19	−21	−06	1
							+00	+18	+02	−04	5
								+15	+24	−05	6
									+19	−26	8
										−02	9
											10

fails to correlate with the others because it taps an ideological dimension which differs from the others; however, in this context, the aim is not to distinguish ideological motivations but to differentiate them from other kinds of motivation. Conceptually, the type seems to represent an impulse to join the party for the sake of pursuing the public goals expressed in its ideology. It entails a high level of identification, or linkage between the personal, micro-level welfare and that of the macro system. It involves a developed sense of empathy permitting the connection of personal needs, aspirations, and frustrations with success or failure to realize public goals.

Type 2: Careerist Motivation. This cluster is composed of the following items: 1) I have friends in the party, 2) I want to make political work my profession, and 3) I wanted to be near those doing important things. While this cluster fits together in statistical terms, item 1 appears conceptually dissonant (and indeed, would appear to be a part of type 3). Items 2 and 3 do fit well both logically and statistically, defining a motivational linkage in which the self seeks through upward mobility in the system such material rewards as income, career, status and power. The linkage of the macro- and micro-levels lies less in the actor's identification with public goals than in their impact on his personal interests; as he is dependent on the broader context for need satisfaction they constitute opportunities or threats. But how can the item "friends in the party" be explained? It makes sense in this cluster only if we take it to be an indicator that respondents seeking upward mobility associate having friends in higher places as important to such aspirations. As this seems to be plausible in view of what is known about the importance of personal connections in "prismatic" societies, it was decided to follow the lead of the statistics and include it in the cluster.

Type 3: Personalist/Localist Motivation. This motivation type was indicated by the clustering of the following picks: 5) It gives me a feeling of recognition in my village, 6) Helps me fulfill my sense of community duty, 8) Felt admiration for a party leader, 9) People I trusted were party members. This motivation type was originally thought of as involving only "personalism" or a tendency to join because of personal connections with or loyalty to party members as expressed by items 8 and 9. Items 5 and 6 were not expected to be included in the cluster. The statistical inter-correlations of this group and their common negative correlation with the other items, however, suggested that the items might indeed express a common motivation type which combined personalistic with localistic kinds of connections. Conceptually, this combination does make sense. In this type of motivational linkage, the macro context is given meaning for the recruit *indirectly*, through its impact on the local context or its mediation or representation there by familiar persons. Thus, national level changes and the goals of the national elite take their meaning from the changes in the persons who hold local status and exercise leadership in the village or quarter, from changes in the values and behavior of these leaders, or the distribution of influence among them. Persons join because of micro-satisfactions derived from diffuse face-to-face personal relations in the local community. They join from a desire to share in the social status of local influentials, and to be integrated into the local center of activity. As one respondent remarks: "The Shebîbe is the center of rays in the village." And, linked in with these motives seems to be a desire to serve the local community.

The distribution of the motivation types in the sample is shown in Table 11. These figures should not, of course, be thought of as having a precise quantitative meaning, given the tentativeness of the method and data from which they were derived. It seems unjustifiable to claim more for them than the suggestion that the three motivation types play roughly equal roles in political recruitment. The career motivation is probably understated, especially in view of the explicit promises of career benefits made to members. It must also be understood that in the case of any given actor, a mix of motivation types is likely to be found. The types may be evenly balanced, in which case the person may be oriented to all three types of ends–nation, career, and village. If they are balanced, the person might experience some inner conflict, particularily at times when choices between these values are demanded by circumstances, for instance a conflict of personal career prospects and ideological principle, service in the village or a career in the city, the needs of the local folk versus those of the regime center. In other cases, a particular motivation type may predominate in a given individual. Presuming that these motivational types do indeed represent actual forces in recruitment, what assessment can be made as to the performance of the recruitment system as as to the consequences for the regime?

The ideological motivation is critical for a revolutionary system as a source of power and is the motivation which, ideally, recruitment practices are designed to maximize. Conceptually, it may be expected that the ideologues hold regime goals most intensely and expend more energy in their pursuit than

TABLE 11 *Distribution of motivation types (in percent)*

Ideological	36
Careerist	26
Personalist/Localist	38

others, while demanding fewer personal or immediate rewards in return. Statistically our sample gives some support to this expectation. Cross-tabular analysis indicates that the ideological motivation type is associated with a higher general ideological orientation to regime goals (G = .35), higher nationalism (G = .38), higher socialism (G = .68), and higher secularism (G = .60). It seems also to be associated with higher effort expended in political participation (G = .47) and a higher sense of political efficacy (G = .41). Historically, it is indeed the militants who appear to have given the Ba'th regime its drive and durability. Animated by visions of radical change, they have presided over the drafting of the main lines of the party's goals and strategy, and over the establishment of the new political institutions in Syria. The ideological motivation seems reflected in the intense drive toward radical change which has been so powerful in contemporary Syria. To it may also be attributed much of the bitter conflict and rivalry which has characterized much of this change. Another cost of this orientation, from a pragmatic point of view, could be the rigidity and irrealism which it could be accused of introducing into decision-making.

There is some tendency for this motivation to correspond to certain social types. It is found most heavily among students (G = .53, 10 percent chance of error), non-religious practitioners (G = .45), and those from Ba'thist families of the lower middle or lower classes. Religious practitioners and recruits from the upper class are least likely to have this motivational dimension (G = −.33). This may be another indicator of the utility of the Ba'th strategy of seeking out the youth of the lower middle and lower classes as its most appropriate base of power–at least insofar as it aims to institutionalize the revolutionary changes of the last decade and a half. It also indicates some of the likely consequences of recruiting from the religiously pious or from those of higher social status.

The careerist motivation type is less desirable from the point of view of the ideal revolutionary recruitment strategy. The careerist may seek to serve the regime, but has relatively high expectations for rewards in return, that is, for income, status, and power through upward mobility. Insofar as the resources of the regime are expanding and such rewards can be made available, the energies and commitments of the careerist can be engaged. In Syria today considerable opportunities are opening up, especially for those with Ba'thist connections in the political apparatuses, army, bureaucracy and expanding public enterprises. However, social mobilization and the disruption of the stable system of status and stratification by the Revolution appears to have unleased considerable appetite among previously deprived persons for income, status, and power. As in so many developing countries, even as national resources expand, aspirations are expanding at a greater rate. In such a situation of relative scarcity, it is

easily imaginable that the micro-interests of the careerist and the macro-interests of the system might diverge. If unrewarded according to his expectations, the careerist may fail to perform for system goals. He may become "corrupt," demanding immediate and illicit rewards for performance, and seeking satisfaction outside the norms set up to maximize regime performance. The apparent growth in the incidence of corruption in the regime may well be attributed to a growth of careerism in a situation of relative scarcity. The careerist may also, as the association of "friends in the party" with the motivation type suggests, seek rewards less through performance than through the cultivation of personal connections. This tendency could well generate an exclusivistic patron/client-like ingroupism inside the regime–at the expense of the broader public and regime performance. Ultimately, whether this negative side of careerism can be kept within reasonable bounds probably depends on the ability of the system to expand power and productivity at a rate permitting a greater distribution of rewards–especially at a time when the vast wealth available in the oil states stimulates appetites and envy throughout the Middle East. But much also depends on the quality of the leadership in the coming years; unfortunately the rapid growth of corruption during the mid-seventies at the very apex of the regime and the public controversy and cynicism generated by it gives little cause for optimism, despite the launching of a much heralded Presidential anti-corruption campaign. Thus, the utility of the careerist is ambiguous: a resource which cannot be ignored, but also a potential threat. This ambiguity may be reflected in the fact that careerism fails to correlate strongly with any particular attitudinal or behavioral trend.[40]

The motivation type called "personalist/localist" also has its advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of the regime. One advantage is that the personalist-localist seems to make relatively few demands on the system, being satisfied with such rewards as local status and personal relations. This motivation type correlates with the citation of "solidarity" rewards by respondents in the open-ended question (G = .82) and seems similar to those found by Barnes in his study of motivation in the Italian Socialist Party.[41] Barnes discovered that many people, especially in local branches, were able to derive solidarity satisfactions from participation which made their commitments worthwhile even though they did not derive material benefits and were not intensely ideological. In the case of Syria, where old solidarities and identifications are eroding in a period of rapid social change, it seems natural that persons would seek relief from anomie and insecurity generated by these changes by trying to integrate themselves into a new grouping. The party and Shebîbe constitute a new system of roles and expectations connected with the national center which may offer identity, meaning and security. The importance of this motivation for the regime is that it can act as a inexpensive reward useful for keeping large numbers of people activated and involved, for ideological motivations probably never stir more than a minority and material incentives are too scarce to be given to all participants. Further, as the personalist/localists are not discontented with life in the village, as the mobile-aspirant careerist and outward-looking ideologue may well be, they can provide the regime with a valuable pool of

leadership in the local communities as important linkage points into the villages and quarters. They impart to the regime a certain stability, providing roots in local society and helping to keep the center in touch with needs at the basic level.

One disadvantage of the personalist/localist, however, is that he seems to be relatively weakly oriented to the regime's goals, and to perform at a relatively low level in their service. The motivation type seems associated with a lower general ideological intensity (G = −.40, but 15 percent chance of error), lower nationalism (G = −.66), lower socialism (G = −.44) and lower secularism (G = −.32, but 20 percent chance of error). It is also associated with a lower level of participation (G = −.47) and lower political efficacy (G = −.44). Therefore as an element in the mobilization of power, this motivation type is certainly less reliable than would be desirable. Another danger for the system is that in political organizations dominated by this sort of motivation there is always a chance that the organization might be turned into a local "in-group" based on personalities and families, fragmenting the locality along these lines, and using public programs for particularistic ends. In such a case, the mobilization of power in the village is likely to be paralyzed.

The strength of this motivation type in the organization is, of course, an inevitable byproduct of the regime's efforts to extend its infrastructure into a society which remains in many ways traditional; a modernizing elite which aims to mobilize power cannot avoid the risk that its organizational tools will be, in part, traditionalized as they activate such a population.

As might be expected, personalist/localist motivations are heaviest among religious practitioners (G = .31), and non-students (G = .27). Among the classes, the middle strata are least likely to exhibit this motivation, probably reflecting the higher social mobilization of this group. Interestingly, the upper classes seem most likely to have this orientation. This suggests that persons from this stratum, not ideologically motivated or in need of careers, join the organization seeking to avoid exclusion from the local system of solidarity, and hoping to maintain their high status ranking.[42] This points up the utility for the regime of its policy of trying to bypass the traditional holders of wealth and status in the village and make its connections directly to groups of lower traditional status and wealth (but higher education) who appear more susceptible to mobilization.

Organizational Mobility. Respondents were asked to indicate the level of office, if any, which they held in the organization. This permits some exploration of the criteria used in promotions, although it allows us only a limited view, as our respondents were distributed among only three lower levels. These three levels were a) non-office-holders, b) low office-holders, and c) intermediate office holders at the district and provincial levels. The following differentiations according to social background, attitudes and motivations were found in comparing the three levels of the organization. In terms of class, there is a strong direct association between higher organizational rank and lower class background (G = .56). In order to test the impact of factors such as friendship or

TABLE 12 *Ideological commitment of office holders (in percent)*

Level	Ideological intensity		
	High	Medium	Low
Intermediate office	37.5	12.5	50.0
Low office	32.0	48.0	20.0
No office	22.7	27.3	50.0

kinship on mobility, the status of those from Ba'thist and non-Ba'thist families was compared, and that of persons who said they were brought into the party by friends with those who did not cite such connections. There does not seem to be any greater opportunity for those in our sample from Ba'thist families than from those without such connections, and in fact, of those in intermediate level offices, 65 percent were from non-Ba'th families though non-Ba'this represented only 50.8 percent of the sample. 33 percent of the respondents were brought into the party by friends, and these constituted 31.6 percent of non-office-holders, 38.9 percent of low-office-holders and 25 percent of high-office-holders, again, no evidence of the play of a particularistic factor. One striking finding was the fact that 83 percent of those holding offices were religious practitioners.

In the comparison of attitudes, it was found that the general level of ideological commitment appears highest at the level of low offices, but in general there is no strong relation between higher ideological intensity and higher rank (G = .21). This weak relationship repeats itself on the scales of nationalism (G = .32), socialism (G = .00), and secularism (G = .22).

In the cross tabulations of motivational types with organizational level, it was found that low level office holders score somewhat higher than the others on the ideological scale, and on the personalist/localist scale, they scored somewhat lower, while intermediate level office holders scored somewhat higher. Careerism showed no association with organizational level.

Is it possible to identify in these associations any common principles on which mobility to higher offices appears to be based? Certain negative propositions do appear to be suggested. First, control of wealth and status does not seem to offer advantages to those seeking political office; in fact, upper class status may be a liability if, as seems indicated, the regime is using lower class origin as a kind of shorthand for political virtue. Second, neither kinship, friendship, and other kinds of particularistic solidarities seem to constitute a systematic principle of recruitment and mobility. Finally, intensity of ideological commitment does not seem to constitute a systematic principle of recruitment to higher levels. Indeed, the high proportion of religious practitioners in offices even suggests discrimination against radical secularists.

Further light may be shed on mobility mechanisms by focusing on the role of ideological attitudes and motivations in mobility. It was noted that while lower level office holders show a somewhat greater tendency toward higher ideologi-

TABLE 13 *Cross-tabulation of motivational types with organizational level (in percent)*

	Ideological motivation			Personalist/local motivation		
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
Inter. office	25.0	25.0	50.0	25.0	25.0	50.0
Low office	25.0	41.7	33.3	12.5	41.7	45.8
No office	12.5	37.5	50.0	25.0	56.3	18.8

cal commitments, intermediate office holders did not. Investigation of this phenomenon revealed that these intermediate office holders appeared to be of two fairly distinct types, one group which scored quite high on ideology and another which scored very low (see Table 12). The explanation of this seems to be that, in fact, the two types have been recruited to their intermediate level offices in two quite different ways; those with high ideological scores are political types who have risen in the organization on the basis of party service. Those with very low ideological scores are persons who have been asked to serve in these leadership roles on the basis of their *professional* roles because they are teachers and administrators in the schools. While they may in fact have spent some time as organizational members before receiving their offices, it seems clear that they hold their positions on the basis of professional status rather than political qualifications. This practice entails a kind of lateral co-optation which, to some extent, bypasses the ideal typical recruitment model.

This finding takes on added implications because there is evidence that it is not confined to the Shebîbe organization, but has even appeared in the party itself. There it comes in the wake of the replacement of elections of office holders by appointments from above. Some examples will illustrate the meaning of this practice. In one party cell in a university, a professor who is low in ideological orientation has been appointed as cell secretary, and for that reason is held in low esteem by the student partisans belonging to the cell. He could never have attained his position by election or appointment in terms of ideological commitment; rather his appointment seems attributable to his high status professional role.[43] In a second case, a cell in a public enterprise, the manager has been appointed party head, which again has aroused the antagonism of employee party members who would not have elected him under the previous electoral system.[44] The incidence of this practice is not limited to lower level positions: there has been an increasing tendency to award important posts in the military and economic establishments to persons who have professional qualifications, but who have not been closely identified with the party. On the other hand, all of the important party executive posts from the district to the national level remain in the hands of long-time party veterans.[45] These alterations in recruitment practices seem to reflect a diminuation in ideological-political criteria in promotion policy following on the assumption of power by the more pragmatic Asad leadership in 1971. A change such as the appointment of the manager in an enterprise as party head may reflect a desire to increase efficiency by consolidating managerial powers, even at the expense of the political

advantages of a "dual" leadership. Besides this, the alterations probably reflect an effort by the Asad leadership to expand its support base, integrate itself with society and neutralize the influence of ideological radicals at the bases who have not entirely approved of its assumption of power at the expense of the party left wing.

The pattern of mobility thus presents a complicated picture. This is partly because the criteria of mobility seem to be undergoing some change. It probably also reflects the fact that recruitment and promotion processes involve a variety of forces–ideological commitments, personal connections, seniority, professional status, and various kinds of political skills and aptitudes. The lack of clarity may also reflect the crudity of the analytical tools available and the limitations of the data set. Thus, the fact that the data failed to confirm more impressionistic evidence that personal connections play an ever increasing role in personnel decisions in Syria hardly disproves the proposition. The one factor which did appear fairly clearly, carrying over from the previous discussion, seems to be the emphasis on tapping the energies of the lower classes, reflected here in their greater access to leadership roles.

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the historical, structural and statistical evidence offered in this study, can anything be said as to how well the recruitment infrastructure in Syria is performing?

The analysis in this paper indicates that the regime has scored major successes in its efforts at quantitative recruitment mobilization. The discussion of recruitment occasions suggests that this success may be attributed in great part to the role the Ba'th has played in the important social and national currents which have agitated Syria. It has also been suggested that the recruitment strategy aimed at the lower classes has been very productive. The broad mobilization of lower class and rural elements which seem well disposed to share regime goals appears to be a significant base of regime stability and source of power. If, as our data suggests, lower class origin is a part of the criteria for recruitment and upward mobility, this may be giving the regime substantial roots in the masses it professes to serve.

A more difficult question is the extent to which the system has produced recruits of a political and ideological quality necessary to sustain the Ba'th Revolution to which the regime is still publically committed as well as a reasonable level of system performance. If part of the original intention in forging the recruitment structure was, in the Leninist tradition, to institutionize a regularized set of recruitment rules and criteria capable of producing and sustaining a homogeneous elite and sub-elite committed to a definite shared revolutionary vision as a basis for decision-making and solidarity, its success must be seen as limited. The formal set of rules aimed at governing recruitment on political-ideological grounds has not been sufficiently operationalized to prevent the use of kinship, friendship, or sectarian connections, or even the use of violence in competition for political roles. What is more, our statistical analysis of mobility

failed to uncover the workings of a strong incidence of systematic upward mobility by ideological criteria. The strong incidence of careerist and personalist/localist motivation in the recruitment sample gives no reason to believe ideological types are being favored in the original selection process either. The high incidence of elite conflict (though partly a result of recruitment practices prior to the adoption of the Leninist model) testifies to the limits of consensus on goals generated inside the regime and the data on the Youth Union indicate such tensions may persist, spelling trouble in the future. Nor has the system prevented the recent diminuation in ideological commitment. It is difficult to know precisely what meaning to give to the weightings uncovered for the motivation types, but something must be happening to an ostensibly revolutionary party when two-thirds of recruitment seems to be on nonideological motivational grounds.

The strong incidence of careerism and personalist-localist orientations probably reflects several deviations from the pure Leninist model, each of which must have its costs. For example, perhaps careerism is a continuing sign of the negative aspects–corruption, personal rivalry, and "opportunism"–which have always seemed to tarnish the idealism of the Ba'th effort. The strength of personalist/localist orientations, evidently heaviest at the critical local juncture of elites and masses may be a sign that although the regime has forged an organizational linkage with the bases of society, the quality of the cadres constituting that linkage may be such that *attitudinal* links to the national center may sometimes be rather tenuous. Of course, in developing countries with "prismatic" characteristics, such a cultural lag is to be expected. The cost to be paid is that power mobilization at the basic level may often be considerably inefficient. The rapid mobility of local elements to the center in the course of the Ba'thist revolution suggests that such inefficiency may not be confined purely to the village.

These rather abstract considerations do correspond to more impressionistic concrete evidence. The typical Ba'th party member appears to have only a passing resemblence to the tough zealous militants found in true Leninist regimes like North Vietnam or China. Many do not appear to be exceptionally alert ideologically. They talk much more than they act, and there is no evidence that they are any more disciplined or possess more drive than non-party members. In fact, culturally, they seem to reflect their society far too much to be able to radically transform it. If their detractors are right, many are more interested in privileges than in performance. Because exceptional performance is not expected of them, their privileges are naturally resented. In sum, their claim to constitute a political vanguard with a right to rule by virtue of superior political consciousness and ability seems doubtful, and, more important, it is not taken very seriously in Syria.

If, on the other hand, we adopt more modest standards for judging recruitment performance, namely consolidation of the Ba'thi political system and the creation of a body of followers politically loyal to the regime and to Ba'thist ideas in a broad sense, but not necessarily intense ideologues, then we may arrive at a less negative assessment. It could be fairly argued that despite intra-

elite conflict and several alterations in regime course, the recruitment system has helped consolidate a fairly definite political orientation shared broadly by elite and base which could properly be called "Ba'thist" and which has persisted for nearly a decade and a half. It may not be too much to say that this new "paradigm" has given a coherence to the policies, decisions and actions of government in Syria which was lacking prior to the rise of the Ba'th to power. Both this coherence and the general consolidation of the regime have been possible partly because the party organization has, over the period since 1963 served as the dominant channel of selection and socialization. The creation of the Revolutionary Youth Federation has undoubtedly further enhanced coherence and consolidation by permitting the regime to tap a regularized and broad flow of recruits from the new generation, and thereby to ensure the continuity of its "paradigm" in the years ahead. While our data do appear to detect the seeds of potential conflict over issues such as socialist and secularist radicalism, they also indicate that the attitudes of the Shebîbe recruits are broadly congruent with some mix of the nationalism and socialism which make up the Ba'thi paradigm. The motivational data does indicate that commitments to the ideology are still being generated and the evident receptivity of the lower and lower middle class recruits to the ideology suggests it is becoming part of the political culture of large parts of the population.

Consolidation of a political system in a society such as Syria, traditionally characterized by a mosaic-like social structure and great class and urban-rural gaps, has certainly required bridging of such social differences. A pattern of political recruitment cutting across social differentiations when combined with socialization into a common ideology is a useful way of integrating centrifugal social forces around a common political center. There is some evidence that the Ba'th is bridging social differences with just such a pattern of recruitment. Despite the fact that the party is seen by many Syrians as an Alouite preserve, and that Alouites are, for historical reasons, disproportionately represented in it, it is nevertheless true that the recruitment drive has reached into all of Syria's religious communities and "representatives" of all of them can be found in the regime. Despite the persistence of sectarian tensions and rivalries, the adhesion of the peripheral minority communities to the center, on a relatively secular ideological basis, will probably contribute to the long run integration of the larger political community. The evidence presented in this study does fairly clearly indicate that class and urban-rural differentiations are also being bridged, perhaps for the first time in Syrian history. This may be a clue to the stability of the regime.[46]

The two sets of standards by which the performance of the recruitment system have been measured here are not entirely theoretical; in a way they may correspond to stages in the development of the system. The former set is more appropriate to the first seven years of Ba'th rule when the ideologues held the upper hand and were actively trying to carry out their revolution. One could not be blamed for concluding that they failed to forge a recruitment system which could institutionalize their ideological preferences. One consequence of their work, however, appears to have been the institutionalization of a *political system*, "revolutionary" or not by their standards. The second set of standards

may be more appropriate for measuring the second seven years of the regime presided over by the pragmatists. For them the quasi-Leninist system they inherited has been useful and they have even expanded it. But they have also made it more flexible to serve their somewhat different needs. The incidence of practices resembling lateral co-optation, bypassing party recruitment rules, the greater reliance on technocrats in government and professional non-political officers in the army command, the establishment of the National Progressive Front, giving the members of the other small progressive nationalist parties in Syria a chance to hold regime roles–all reflect this alteration in the recruitment system. The changes in recruitment reflect a change in goals; a lessening of ideological intensity, a shift away from the desire to promote further radical change, an effort to placate opposition and better integrate regime and society after years of considerable disjuncture, an effort to increase the emphasis on practical efficiency and competence. For the present leaders, the more modest weight now given to the ideological criteria the system was originally designed to maximize also makes sense on purely practical grounds: it gives them more freedom at the top, for unlike ideologues, careerists and personalist/localists are unlikely to challenge their decisions. Similar tendencies have been observed in other revolutions once they reach the stage of "institutionalization."

The recruitment picture is thus a mixed one. It seems to have worked well enough to consolidate the regime, give it coherence, and even allow it to mobilize the power to carry out an extensive program of political and social change. But, in changing societies, it is one thing to tear down the old structure and establish new institutions in its place, and another thing to inculcate the attitudes, motivations and norms needed to make them work so as to push the development effort ahead. Is the Ba'th recruitment system producing the kind of leadership that can do this? On the basis of the evidence offered in this study, this must remain an open question. If one takes the position that a body of leaders with an intense commitment and powerful achievement drive–whether inner-directed and self-disciplined Puritan capitalists or Marxist-Leninist militant socialists–is needed to lift the developing countries out of their backwardness, then there is room for considerable doubt. But if we do not insist on this the question remains open: are motivations strong enough to animate the new institutions being generated? In particular, are ideological motivations strong enough to endow the regime with a strong public purpose and drive or will careerism win out and the system disintegrate into a mere framework for personal rivalries and competition over spoils? By the mid-seventies, this struggle had become an issue of open debate in Syria.

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO
CAIRO, EGYPT

NOTES

[1] The importance of a "reliable group of persons . . . primarily oriented to the execution of the supreme authority's general policy and specific commands" is stressed by Weber (Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, New York, 1964, pp. 324–25), while Lenin places

great importance on the development of a body of "professional revolutionaries" to lead and organize the masses.

[2] The best general discussion of Ba'thist organizational doctrine is to be found in National Leadership, The Ba'th Arab Socialist Party, *Some Theoretical Points of Departure*, Damascus, 1973, pp. 57–102.

[3] In 1971, this policy was altered to include recruitment through the other small parties participating in the National Progressive Front, but the Ba'th Party retained controlling voice in this institution.

[4] The 8th National Congress in May 1965 specified the specialized task of the party apparatus: "The Sphere of work for the Party apparatus . . . lies in popular and mass organization." —Qiyâd al-Qaumiyya, *Bayânât*, 1965, p. 35.

[5] "Resolutions of the 6th National Congress," in *Arab Political Documents, 1963*, Beirut, 1964, p. 440.

[6] Party reports; discussions, and observations in Syria.

[7] Discussions, party militant, Damascus, 1974.

[8] "Statutes of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party," in *Arab Political Documents, 1963*, Beirut, 1964, pp. 445–461.

[9] Qiyâd al-Qaumiyya, *al-Niẓâm al-Dâk̲hlî*, 1968, and *al-Niẓâm al-Dâk̲halî*, 1971. (Party Rules).

[10] Ibid.

[11] According to figures from (captured) Ba'thi records published by Avraham Ben-Tsur, "The Composition of the Membership of the Ba'th Party in the Kuneitra Region," *The New East*, XVIII (1968), pp. 269–73, of the 2219 members of the Quneitra branch, only 60 were full members in 1967.

[12] Interview, Director of the Cultural Bureau, National Command, Damascus, 1974. Continuous socialization, especially in the 1966–70 period made considerable demands on members' time, and until 1971 all were required to take training in arms with the Popular Army. Permanent party schools exist at the provincial level as well as at the center, and according to the head of the Damascus Province School (which also serves party branches among the Palestinians and security forces) 5 two-month courses for 300 cadres are held yearly in his institution. The writer saw educational manuals on such topics as agrarian reform implementation, union organization, development of Zionism, socialist transformation, imperialism, etc.

[13] Party Rules.

[14] Discussion, party militant, Damascus, 1974.

[15] The call for new elections is not purely a nominal phenomenon. Top leaders have been known to dissolve lower level organs only to have the old leaders repeatedly returned in subsequent elections.

[16] Party Rules.

[17] According to Ben-Tzur's figures (see above) there were 2219 members in the Quneitra branch in 1967 which is about 4 percent of the adult population of the province. According to party figures in another district which the writer was able to examine in 1974, the party had a membership of about 2000 out of an adult population of less than 50,000–again a percentage of about 4 percent. If this proportion holds throughout the country, and there is no reason to think it does not, total party membership can be estimated at about 107,185. By comparison, it may be noted that the Chinese Communist Party constitutes about 2.4 percent of the adult population and the CPSU about 7 percent in their respective countries.

[18] Calculated on the 1970 census, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Population Census in the Syrian Arab Republic, 1970*, Vol I, Damascus.

[19] Discussions, Party Militant, Damascus, 1974.

[20] Rabinovich, *Syria Under the Ba'th, 1963–66*, New York, 1972, quotes a party report which refers to the "difficult phase" following the coup during which the urgency of expansion "made it impossible at the time to insist on objective standards," and that "friendship, family relationship . . . were the basis of admission, which led to the infiltration of elements alien and strange to the Party's mentality . . ."

[21] Aflaq and Bitar both complained (at a time when their rivals were chipping away at their power) of persons who "leaped" to the levers of power. The most dramatic case of such rapid mobility by an undesirable element, was that of the Israeli spy, Eli Cohen, alias Kamal Taabet, who, as the protege of a important Bathi officer, hurdled over the one year helpers' period of prepa-

ration, was introduced to the party Secretary-General, Aflaq, and was soon elected to the command of the basic level organ in his neighborhood. Before his discovery 1½ years later, he seems to have made it to the leadership of the provincial level party branch. See Zwy Aldouby and Jerrold Ballinger, *The Shattered Silence*, New York, 1971, pp. 227–230.

[22] For example, the dispute between moderates and radicals over the proper policy toward the Syrian upper and middle classes was naturally reflected in conflict over the suitable social origins of members. In 1966, the radicals won out and the upper and perhaps upper middle classes were excluded from membership, but after 1971 this may have changed again.

[23] This was indicated by organizational charts at the union headquarters. In trips throughout the Syrian countryside the writer also had the opportunity to verify the existence of local organizations in many villages.

[24] Qiyâd al-Ittihad, *al-Niẓâm al-Dâḵẖalî*.

[25] Ibid.

[26] A steady flow of membership applications seems to flow into headquarters.

[27] *al-Niẓâm*

[28] Observations at union congresses.

[29] The writer discussed the activities of the union with party youth, had the opportunity to observe the formation of programs at congresses, and reviewed the party plan for the year with the President of the Federation, Damascus, 1974. A good example of the constraints put on activity by the youth from above was the refusal to one branch of permission to publish a branch magazine on the grounds that it would have to be censored by the central headquarters–a task which was evidently thought to be too much trouble.

[30] This survey was given as part of a larger program of research done on the Syrian political system with the permission and cooperation of the National Command of the ruling Ba'th Party in 1974. As the youth organization was holding a series of meetings at the time of the writer's stay in Syria, the opportunity arose to distribute questionnaires to those attending, of which 72 were returned. The writer administered the questionnaires personally and observed no evidence of attempts to control or bias responses. The questionnaires were given in three meetings in Katana, Ghouta-Sharqiyya, and Douma, all in the province of Rural Damascus. As such, the sample cannot be held to be "representative" of the countrywide organization in a *technical* sense. The writer believes the results to be generally relevant to Syria as a whole, but the reader should take account of two characteristics which somewhat distinguish the area of the survey; namely, that this province is probably the most socially mobilized area outside the cities, but secondly that it has not been a notable stronghold of Ba'thist recruitment. Given these factors, conclusions drawn in the analysis as regards the organization as a whole are offered as only tentative.

In order to guard against the possibility that some relationships, given the relatively small sample size (N = 72), resulted from purely random chance, those associations not statistically significant at the .05 level as measured by Chi-square, were not used unless specifically noted.

[31] The estimated percentages of the population in the class categories were derived from the 1970 Population Census; they are only estimates as class breakdowns are not given in the census and the writer had to work from occupational breakdowns. These categories were devised by asking respondants if their fathers owned property and employed persons, rather than asking them to place themselves in the stratification system. As such, those in the "Upper and middle classes" are so classified, not necessarily because they are very wealthy (though they may be) but because they control sufficient property to be able to hire the labor of others. According to Shebîbe rules, persons of "social origins hostile to organization goals" are restricted from membership. It may be that this restriction is taken to refer to the old elite of wealth and status rather than persons in the "upper strata" as defined here, as persons who hire labor do get admitted to the organization.

[32] These figures do correspond to the picture of the typical party member which emerges from historical study of the party's development, from the background profiles of party leaders which are available, and from observation and discussions in Syria. The typical Ba'thist comes from the rural small town lower middle class or from the peasantry. According to Van Dusen the current party elite are "ex-peasants", from the lowest socio-economic strata able to get a high school education. See Michael H. Van Dusen, "Syria: Downfall of a Traditional Elite," in Frank Tachau (Ed.), *Political Elites and Political Modernization in the Middle East* (Cambridge, 1975).

[33] The urban/rural differentiation is taken from the Census for this district, while the Ba'th break-

down derives from our former calculation of the proportion of the population recruited into the party.

[34] The ideological scale was constructed by giving each respondant points for each question according to whether they gave the ideologically correct response, a middle response, or an incorrect response, with scores on each question being added to form a total score. The nationalism scale was constructed in the same way, but using only questions 1 and 2, the socialism scale by using questions 3–6, and the secularism scale relying on questions 8–9.

[35] Because only five to six cases fall into the upper stratum in these cross-tabulations, conclusions about them must be regarded with caution. For example, if a statistic sensitive to these skewed marginal distributions is used to describe the relation between class and socialist attitudes, the result is numerically lower (G = .40, but Tau-B = .22). The orientations attributed to the upper classes by these associations can probably be taken as real, however. More impressionistic evidence about their attitudes is congruent with these findings. Further, throughout the study, the orientations of this stratum are consistently in the same direction. Also one other study known to the author on the attitudes of Syrians confirms some of the findings of this survey in regard to the distribution of attitudes between social groups. See Malakah Abyad, "Values of Syrian Youth: A Study Based on Syrian Students in Damascus University," Master's Thesis, American University of Beirut, 1968.

[36] In order to keep the differences between mobilizational regimes in perspective, however, it should be noted that Ba'th mobilizational and penetrative efforts pale in comparison to that of the Chinese Communist Party whose social composition is 80 percent workers or peasants–a proportion much closer to the actual population distribution than is the case with the Ba'th.

[37] The justification for identifying the three clusters indicated in Table 10 rests principally on the fact that those items enclosed in each triangle tend to inter-correlate positively with each other, while correlating negatively with other items. Number 10, which did not correlate and number 11, picked only twice, were dropped.

[38] Each respondent was given one point on each motivation type for each pick which corresponded to that particular motivation.

[39] The participation index was constructed from questions asking respondents the amount of time spent in party work, committees served on, and offices held. The efficacy index was constructed from the standard questions regarding what respondants would do if they believed a decision taken by the government was incorrect, whether they had ever done anything to try to correct such a decision, and whether they believed politics too complicated for ordinary people.

[40] For an interesting study of a motivational pattern which could be called "careerist" active in recruitment of communists in Malaya who later defected to the government, see Lucian Pye, *Guerilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meanings* (Princeton, 1956).

[41] Samuel H. Barnes, "Party Democracy and the Logic of Collective Action," in William J. Crotty (Ed.), *Approaches to the Study of Party Organization*, Boston, 1968.

[42]

	Personalist orientation		
	High	Medium	Low
Upper	25%	50%	25%
Middle	8%	50%	42%
Lower	18%	47%	35%

[43] Ba'thi militant, Damascus, 1974.

[44] Another Ba'thi militant, Damascus, 1974.

[45] Interviews with provincial and district level party executives, 1974.

[46] Before the Ba'th, Syria was, as measured on Russett's scale of instability, the most unstable country in the world. See Bruce M. Russett, et. al., *Yale Handbook of Social and Political Indicators* (New Haven, 1964).