# Leaders, Land, and Limousines: Emir Versus Sheikh[1]

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The Al-Fadl and the Al-Hassanna Bedouin are two sheep raising tribes in the Syria-Lebanon Region. In the winter these tribes migrate regularly with their goats and sheep to pastures in the Syrian Desert (*Badia*), and in the summer they move into the Beqaa Valley pastures of Lebanon (see Map 1). Over the past ten to fifteen years, these tribal people have systematically integrated themselves into the regional economy which is rapidly modernizing. This economic integration has been quickened by their shift from camel to truck transport. Furthermore, this integration has affected certain corporate interests and, as a consequence, the tribal political organization has been transformed. The traditional leaders, the Emir and the Sheikh, are today incorporated into the national political system as elected deputies to Parliament.[2] Yet the relationships of the Emir and the Sheikh to their respective tribesmen are not identical, and each has adjusted differently to issues of authority, land, and economic power.

## Tribal Political Organization

Certain basic corporate interests underlie Bedouin tribal political organization. The nature of the pastoral economy, as well as its physical and social environment require a para-military political organization of Bedouin tribes based on a real or "fictional" series of overlapping kin groups. The tribe is defined as a single unit through universal recognition of a sheikh and his *Beit*, or "house." Al-Fadl tribesmen, for example, universally recognize themselves as "belonging" to the Emir Faour and his *Beit* (*Beit Faour*), while Al-Hassanna tribesmen see themselves as "belonging" to Sheikh Taamir and his *Beit* (*Beit Ibn-Milhem*).[3]

Chains of command have traditionally linked subsections of the tribe ultimately to the sheikh. The smallest unit is generally agreed to be the *Beit* (minimal lineage). Numerous *Beits*, claiming descent from a common ancestor, form a *fakhad* (maximal lineage). The Al-Fadl link the *fakhad* and its council of elders directly to the head of the tribe, while the Al-Hassanna link the *fakhad* to the *ashiira* (subtribe) head. Apparently it is this head, or *ashiira* leader, who is linked directly to the sheikh of the tribe.[4]

While the *Beit* is the basic economic unit, the *fakhad* and the *ashiira* and/or the *qabila* (tribe) are organized primarily to serve the tribal community's interests of mutual self-defense, collective pasture rights and migrations. Historical documents (Glubb 1942: 12-37; Ashkenezai 1948; 222-237; Raswan 1930:

**Map 1: Migratory Routes**




494-504; Oppenheim 1939; France 1923-1939) as well as oral histories collected from tribal informants show, for example, that the Bedouin expansion into the Beqaa Valley and the subsequent exploitation of this new ecological niche was conducted by the tribal leader in co-ordination with a council at the *ashiira* level in the case of the Al-Hassanna (*ashiira* Abu Eid), and a council at the *fakhad* level in the case of the Al-Fadl (*fakhad* Hourrouk).

Historically, mutual self-defense in Syria and Lebanon had been maintained by local balances of power between opposing groups. Consequently, the pastoral specialization of the Al-Fadl and the Al-Hassanna, characterized by long migrations, sometimes through areas of minimal security, required an effective defense organization against nontribal marauders. Up to 1928, banditry was rampant in the Beqaa Valley and villages occasionally had to pay ransom to these bandits in order to prevent bloodshed. The few male agnates of a camping unit could not successfully defend themselves against the large and often well armed gangs of bandits. Their defense could only be guaranteed by organizing men into highly mobilized units, under the leadership of one man at the *fakhad* level.

Traditionally, when the Al-Hassanna or Al-Fadl took long interseasonal migrations through hostile territory, each *fakhad* leader (recognized by the council of elders) organized the migration so that, the entire *fakhad* was ready to migrate at one time. Approximately fifteen households moved together as a



unit while the remaining members of the *fakhad* stayed at alert. By co-ordinating units on the alert, and units on the move, the *fakhad* leader was thus generally able successfully to supervise the *fakhad's* interseasonal migration.

The transient nature of pasture right shared collectively by the community also demanded an effective and highly centralized political organization. Tribal land traditionally was administered by the head of the *qabila* through a series of allocations. Political relationships, by and large, characterized the chain of distribution from him, as tribal head, to the *ashiira* or *fakhad* head, to the *Beit* head and, finally, through kinship relations to the individual households.[5] The actual land in use by individual households changed from year to year in relation to the physical environment (particularly the annual rainfall and pasture distribution).

However, rights to use tribal land also involved obligations to maintain these interests. In other words, the collective property rights of the tribe as a whole required a tribal military organization at the *ashiira* or *qabila* level either to defend or acquire highly contested pasture from other tribes. One example of the traditional tribal military organization was the Al-Fadl's prolonged campaign against the Kurds, Druze and Circassians for control of the pasture land in the Golan during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.

In summary, to effectively administer the distribution and allocation of temporary pastures, and to mediate conflicts related to their use, a centralized political organization was called for. Ultimate authority rested with the sheikh; and a hierarchy of command and communication connected the camping units under his responsibility.

The gradual decline of tribal authority in the last 50 years is related to the appearance of a new element in the social environment. The arrival of the French who established a military administration led to the ultimate pacification of the cultivated regions. In the Beqaa Valley this pacification was not completed until the late 1920s, when several bandits were eliminated and *gendarme* stations set up at strategic points at Anjar, Rayyak and Hermel. As French military security in these regions improved, the pastoral camping units' need for community defense at the *fakhad* level against bandits was reduced.

Among the Al-Fadl and the Al-Hassanna, oral histories indicate that during the 1930s the *Beit* alone became responsible for its self-defense. In other words, interseasonal migrations no longer required organization on the *fakhad* level, but rather on the level of the *Beit*. By the 1930s for example, Al-Hassanna *Beits* (consisting of four to as many as fifteen households) began to undertake the long migrations individually.

Once French military power had successfully instituted a form of security in cultivated regions, pacification of the tribes was attempted; and after nearly a decade, the French Méharistes were able to impose peace among the Bedouin tribes. Without infringing upon internal administration of the tribes, the peace agreements resolved intertribal feuds and, in general, served to protect the property rights of each tribe.[6] With the establishment of a Méharitse unit acting as a mediatory link between tribes, the pastoral community's need for mutual defense at the *fakhad* or *ashiira* level diminished.

The French also attempted to regulate tribal pasture rights by defining and assigning pasture areas to particular tribes, thus further reducing the threat of

intertribal warfare. Consequently, the tribal community's military organization on the *ashiira* or *qabila* level for protection of tribal pasture land was no longer necessary. One example is the neutral zone established by the Méharistes between the Haddidiin and the Mawali tribes in 1936-1937. By officially recognizing and freezing tribal territory, the French authorities were themselves assuming the obligation to defend any tribe's rights against the incursions of others.

Not only were the basic corporate interests of the tribe undermined by the activities of the French mandate power, but the internal tribal administration was also indirectly affected. The French land registration policy of the 1930s and the early 1940s completely altered the traditional pattern of land use, administration and allocation.[7] As land came to be permanently registered in the name of a sheikh or other leader, the traditional process of distributing and allocating temporary pastures changed. No longer was land distributed from the *qabila* head to the *ashiira* or *fakhad* head to the *Beit* head and then to individual households. Rather, this chain was replaced by direct communications from the *Beit* heads to the tribal leader (the registered land owner) to determine pasture allocations.

The French mandate power's development and improvement of the system of security and order in the region thus undermined the tribal military-political organization. Consequently, political solidarity at the *fakhad*, *ashiira* and *qabila* level declined, and smaller tribal segments (the *Beits*) tended to become autonomous units. However, the administrative organization of the tribes still remained in part.

Internal tribal affairs and settlements of disputes remained in the hands of the *fakhad* council of elders and ultimately the sheikh. However, since the tribe's solidarity was weakened by developments in the military-political realm, it frequently became difficult to impose punishments such as collective payments or *Jala* (expulsion). Among the Al-Fadl, for example, my informants reported that in the early 1940s, an inter-*Beit* homicide took place. In line with Bedouin tradition, *Jala* (expulsion from the tribe for a period of seven years) of the killer should have followed. In this case, the killer refused to leave, and the *fakhad* council no longer had the power to impose its will upon the individual. The *fakhad*, once guarantor of community security and defense, was no longer an effective unit.

The sheikh's traditional authority was also threatened. Mobilization of the whole tribe in support of his decisions became difficult at times. An indirect indication was the developments within the traditional retinue of the sheikh. A group of hired men, independent from the segments of the tribe, served as the leader's bodyguard when necessary, enforced his decisions, and sometimes disciplined recalcitrant tribal units. During this period the number of men traditionally at the sheikh's disposal was increased. For example, it was during this time that the Emir Faour added a unit, called the *Abeed*, to this retinue.

Thus central authority undermined the basic corporate interests of the tribal community. It also redefined and froze the once highly elastic authority of certain tribal leaders. The leaders who had traditionally represented their communities in dealing with sedentary people, now became "official" links between the tribe and central authorities.



To integrate the tribe into the national political system, a number of tribal sheikhs were appointed by the French mandate power as deputies to Parliament. Emir Faour and Sheikh Milhem were both among the twelve French appointed deputies. These appointments, together with their new wealth as land owners, and their increased mobility offered by motor transport, encouraged many tribal leaders to remove themselves from the tribe and take up residence in major cities like Damascus and Aleppo. The entry of these new factors made the traditional military-political tribal organization obsolete, greatly weakened authority and power at secondary and higher tribal levels, and altered traditional tribal leadership.

The heads of the Al-Fadl and the Al-Hassanna have both been incorporated into the national political system and, today, their roles within the parliamentary system are identical. However, the Emir's and the Sheikh's relationship to their respective tribesmen is dissimilar in terms of authority, land, and wealth.

*Basis of Authority*

The Emir and the Sheikh are now elected members of Parliament. The Sheikh is a deputy from Selimieh, twenty miles east of Homs, while the Emir is a deputy from the Kuneitra district. Their roles and duties within Parliament are identical, and subject to the rules of modern political procedures. While the Emir and the Sheikh regard themselves as representatives of their tribesmen, parliamentary recognition is based on the size of their constituency. Officially these two deputies represent a small fraction of the Syrian population. Though these two leaders have assumed modern political roles in the nation-state, their basis of power is not derived from support within the general voting public, but rather from traditional positions of authority within the Al-Fadl and the Al-Hassanna tribes.

Both the Emir and the Sheikh are members of the sheikhly *Beit* in their respective tribes (see Figures 1 and 2).[8] Among the Al-Fadl, the sheikhly *Beit* (i.e., *Beit* Faour) has been the same since the late eighteenth-early nineteenth century when *Beit* Faour led the tribe in a series of successful military campaigns for pasture land. The sheikhly *Beit* of the Al-Hassanna (*Beit* Ibn Milhem) has been unchanged since the late seventeenth-early eighteenth century when *Beit* Milhem led the tribe from Nejd into the region between Homs and Hama. Surprisingly, the defeat of the tribe in a campaign for pasture land by a Ruwalla-Sbaa alliance in 1850 did not result in a change of sheikhly *Beit*.

Although the Emir and the Sheikh are both members of relatively well established sheikhly *Beits*, there is a wide disparity in the relationship of the Emir to the Al-Fadl and the Sheikh to the Al-Hassanna. This disparity partly develops from discrepant bases of authority held by the Emir's *Beit* and the Sheikh's *Beit* in their respective tribes.

The Ibn Milhem Beit of the Al-Hassanna is "one of the greatest Bedouin families" (Muller 1931: 113-114) renowned for their courage and generosity. Historical sources (Glubb 1942: 12; Burckhardt 1822: 1; Muller 1931: 113-114; Oppenheim 1939; Ashkenazai 1948: 222-237) validate my informants' belief that the *Beit* Milhem led the Al-Hassanna from the Nejd into the Syrian *Badia* as the first of the Aneza tribes to move north and west during the major

**FIGURE 1: Descent Line of Emir Faour**




* present Emir of the Al-Fadl tribe

\+ author of dissertation on the Al-Fadl (1962-1963)

Bedouin expansion of the late eighteenth century. This tribe also holds a prominent position in the social order of Bedouin tribes today, since the Ibn Saud family (founders of modern Saudi Arabia) are descendents of the Al-Hassanna through the Mesalikh branch of the tribe (see Glubb 1942: 13; Oppenheim 1939: 18; Burckhardt 1822: 98).



**FIGURE 2: Descent Line of Sheikh Taamir-il-Milhem**




* present Sheikh of the Al-Hassanna tribe

The traditional prestige and respect accorded the Ibn Milhem family has been reinforced by a series of alliances. The most recent was a political marriage with the powerful Ruwalla tribe. Sheikh Taamir-il-Milhem not only maintains the traditional position of his family within the tribe, but as a result of his father's marriage to the sister of the present head of the Ruwalla, has also strengthened his ties with other Bedouin tribes.

Today Sheikh Taamir-il-Milhem actively exercises what remains of the traditional leadership position. Since the military-political functions related to community self-defense are no longer viable, he has devoted much of his effort

to settling internal disputes. Now the owner of several motor vehicles, he has acquired the mobility to travel long distances to regulate the affairs of his tribesmen.

In the late spring and early summer of 1973, the author was aware of two disputes between Al-Hassanna *Beits* which were awaiting a hearing before Sheikh Taamir-il-Milhem and the council of elders. Disputes which cannot be settled by custom, compromise, or sanctions between *Beits* are, among the Al-Hassanna, set aside until a hearing can be arranged with the Sheikh presiding.

During the summer of 1973, Sheikh Taamir-il-Milhem visited each *Beit* head at least once. In addition, he visited numerous individual camping units. Without exception, each household head in my sample[9] was visited or entertained by Sheikh Taamir during this period (sometimes in the large, white tent belonging to the landowning Kez'oun family).

Thus, Sheikh Taamir-il-Milhem's basis of authority rests not only on the pre-eminence of his *Beit* in Bedouin tradition; it also derives from his personal efforts to increase his *Beit's* authority. Furthermore, by using motor transport, in much the same manner used by American politicians to keep contact with the "grass roots," Sheikh Taamir-il-Milhem maintains and strengthens his position of prestige within the tribe, insuring the continued political support of his tribesmen and constituency.

In contrast, the Al-Fadl sheikhly *Beit* claims descent from Al-Abbas, the Prophet Mohemmed's uncle, and the founder of the Abbassid dynasty (Caliphate) in Baghdad. Al-Fadl tribesmen maintain that Al-Abbas was the original ancestor of the Emir's *Beit* and the origin of the name of the tribe. Though the Al-Fadl tribe appears to be of great antiquity, the association of the Al-Fadl with the present Al-Fadl sheikhly *Beit* appears to be of recent origin (see Figure 1).

Al-Fadl tribesmen maintain that they were once masters of the Syrian *Badia.* In fact, Oppenheim (1939: 325) maintains that the Al-Fadl did rule in the Syrian *Badia* during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, but does not mention what became of the Al-Fadl after the sixteenth century. The Emir Faour maintains that with the rise of the Ottoman Empire, his *Beit* left the *Badia* with a few loyal tribesmen and moved into the Beqaa Valley. Although the Emir does not agree, several of my Al-Fadl informants state that the remaining tribesmen in the *Badia* came to be known as the Mawali tribe under the leadership of an Emir "blessed" by the Turkish Sultan.[10]

Burckhardt reports that he saw the Al-Fadl in the Golan during the early nineteenth century (Burckhardt 1822: 21). Sheikh Fadl completes Burckhardt's observation by explaining that shortly before the period, the Al-Fadl tribesmen in the Beqaa Valley had split again after a feud with the Beni Khalid tribe, and the Emir moved into the Golan. Those tribesmen who remained with the Emir's *Beit* became the founders of the present tribe (Al-Faour 1968: 31-32).

Though some of the *Beits* recently incorporated into the tribe are clearly of non-Bedouin origin (Kurdish), the tribesmen as a whole express feelings of great pride and esteem for the Emir's sheikhly *Beit*; and, in turn, appear to be honored by their own association with it.

Undoubtedly, the much revered Hashimite and Quraish origin of *Beit* Faour is an asset which permits the Emir to maintain his position of authority within



the tribe without the continuous exercise of that authority. Unlike Sheikh Taamir-il-Milhem, the Emir does not use motor vehicles to maintain close contact with his tribesmen.[11] Rather, the mobility which the car offers is used by the Emir to develop and maintain his associations and relations on the basis of his Quraish ancestry. Thus he makes frequent trips to Riyad. There, according to Sheikh Fadl and several other tribal as well as academic sources, he maintains a place on the tribal council of King Khalid along with other Aneza Bedouin leaders. The Emir generally spends the winter months in Riyad, staying in Beirut only during the spring and summer when he makes frequent trips to visit the Hashimite King of Jordan.

In contrast to Sheikh Taamir, the Emir's basis of authority rests not so much on the pre-eminence of his *Beit* within the tribe, but more so on the pre-eminence of his *Beit* throughout the system of Bedouin tribes. Although Sheikh Taamir uses the car to maintain his position of authority within the tribe, the Emir uses it to reinforce his special relationship vis-à-vis the Bedouin sheikhly society.

## LAND USE AND OWNERSHIP

The fundamentally different associations of land to leadership for the Emir and the Sheikh contributes to the distinct relationship each has with his respective tribesmen. Current landholding systems do not allow either leader to exercise authority over allocations of pasture. Yet, the land registration and reform measures of the past few decades greatly affected the leaders' association with their tribesmen.

Among the Al-Hassanna, tribal warfare for pasture land was last recorded in 1850, when they were defeated by a Ruwalla-Sbaa alliance and lost some of their pasture lands in the Homs-Hama area. Thus, after 1850, the Al-Hassanna confined themselves to areas somewhat south, between Homs and Tudmor and the Beqaa Valley. In the 1930s tribal land was registered by the French mandatory power in the name of their Sheikh. Subsequently the Sheikh distributed land to tribesmen wishing to farm; the rest of the tribe continued to utilize the remaining pasture areas. The Sheikh settled within the area, in Selimieh, which became the Al-Hassanna capital. Land was still regarded as tribal property which the Sheikh administered and distributed. According to Al-Hassanna informants, their Sheikh never requested land rental payments. Instead they always made annual presentations to him. Consequently, the income the Sheikh received was in the form of voluntary donations from the tribesmen, and produce from his herds and cultivated fields. This wealth permitted him to display a level of generosity and hospitality traditionally required of a tribal leader. Glubb (1942: 12) states that Sheikh Milhem's "dreams of reviving the glory and splendour of past times . . . together with his inheritance of his father's noted generosity, absorbs most of the revenue from his villages near Homs."

The agrarian reforms of the late 1950s and early 1960s withdrew and redistributed landholdings registered in the name of the Sheikh among his tribesmen. The tribesmen continued, however, to make voluntary annual contributions to their Sheikh. Thus, despite the fact that title to land had been

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## MORAL VERSUS ECONOMIC POWER

Traditionally, an Emir or Sheikh had greater economic resources through which he maintained his position of power. Generosity and hospitality, as measures of a leader's effectiveness, traditionally served to attract the support of tribesmen. Today the Emir Faour and Sheikh Milhem have each gathered the support of their tribesmen, but in different ways.

Sheikh Milhem is a relatively wealthy man with residences and investments in Selimieh and Homs, as well as a large herd of sheep. He maintains his household in the tradition of generous hospitality. One of the most frequent expressions I heard from the Al-Hassanna was that Sheikh Milhem's hospitality is boundless (*Karambo mashhuur*). This hospitality even extends to periods during which his tribesmen are in the Beqaa Valley. During the summer he resides in Chtaura in the heart of the Beqaa Valley. In the course of his frequent visits by car to nearby tribesmen, he arranges numerous feasts, in addition to feasts that are arranged in his honor. Thus, Sheikh Milhem, using his economic wealth and mobility, secures the continued loyalty of his tribesmen.

With the Al-Fadl, support of the Emir is no longer related to economic power. By the late 1950s, his landlord-tenant relationship with the tribe had come to an end when his lands were confiscated during the Agrarian Reforms. Since a great deal of the Emir's potential had once depended on the income from land rent, he was no longer able to maintain the traditional generosity and hospitality expected for one of his social position.

One incident in particular marked a turning point in the moral attitude of the Al-Fadl towards their leaders's status and role. In 1960 the Emir, having left his car where it broke down, walked to a settlement of his tribesmen (Al-Faour 1968: 397). Seeing their Emir walk, while all other tribal leaders had cars, awakened their moral system. Consequently, they set about trying to revalidate the Emir's social status, which had been threatened by his personal economic defeat.

A campaign was conducted by the tribesmen to raise funds in order to purchase a new car for him (Al-Faour 1968: 399). My Al-Fadl informants maintain that certain *Beits* within the tribe began sending voluntary payments of sheep and goat to the Emir's household as a compensation for his material loss. In their eyes the Emir was no longer the landlord to whom the tribe had been paying rent for the last 85 years. He was the leader of their community, therefore, he had to be maintained on an equal social level as other tribal leaders. The Al-Fadl tribesmen took it upon themselves, as a moral responsibility, to see that their leader fulfilled his traditional role.

This response of his tribesmen, the Emir maintains, brought about a change in his own behavior as well. There was a marked increase in his contacts with the tribe and in the number of affairs he handled on their behalf. Though he did not change the pattern of his visits, more tribal elders began to approach him or be invited to visit him in Beirut. By the mid 1960s, the Beirut based Emir was devoting most of his energy in the interest of his tribe.[12]

For example, between 1964-1965, he negotiated with Lebanese authorities on behalf of his tribesmen in the Beqaa Valley. The Al-Fadl units wanted to acquire land along the Anti-Lebanon Mountains. But, since they were not citizens, they were technically not permitted to purchase land in Lebanon. The

Emir assumed what he called the "moral responsibility" to aid them and, through his intercession, the coveted land was finally acquired by these tribal non-citizens. These negotiations were during the Chehab government. Kamal Jumblatt, a Druze Sheikh, was Minister of the Interior. In this way the Al-Fadl tribesmen, faced with a situation precluding the traditional association of leadership with wealth, redefined the role of Emir to fit their moral system. His material generosity was no longer an issue of importance; rather his moral and symbolic position as their leader was paramount. Through the Emir, their basic corporate interest as a single community was reaffirmed.

The trust and responsibility which these tribesmen have placed in their leader is clearly illustrated by the tragic events of 1967. Having lost their land in the Golan, the Al-Fadl tribesmen fled to the Hauran, in the east. Rather than enter refugee camps, they appealed to their Emir to provide new pasture lands for them. This appeal was accepted as a moral duty by the Emir. Today, he regularly commutes by car between Beirut and the tribal council of King Khalid in Riyad in order to negotiate new pasture lands in Saudi Arabia for his displaced tribesmen.

The changes in the basic corporate interests of the Al-Fadl and the Al-Hassanna have greatly affected traditional leadership within the tribe. The organizational changes in the nation-state, particularly in internal security, land registration, and agrarian reform, have greatly diminished the political-military solidarity of the tribe. Although the tribal political organization is greatly altered, the adjustments which the Emir and the Sheikh make to the factors of authority, land and wealth reveal an underlying political solidarity. For the Sheikh this solidarity is expressed in a continuation of traditional leadership attitudes and behavior patterns. For the Emir, this solidarity is expressed in a reaffirmation of the moral system. Yet, both the Emir and the Sheikh, in their capacities as elected deputies to Parliament are regarded by government officials as spokesmen for an administrative region, not as representatives of their tribes. This national attitude indicates that, although the Al-Fadl and the Al-Hassanna have successfully integrated themselves into the regional economy, a political integration is yet to be achieved.

## NOTES

1. This paper is based on field work in 1972-1973 made possible through a grant from the National Science Foundation. For an indepth study of the effect of the truck on the Al-Fadl and Al-Hassanna economy see Chatty 1976.

2. Emir Faour-Al-Faour-Al-Fadl of the Al-Fadl tribe: Sheikh Taamir-il-Milhem of the Al-Hassanna tribe; in the last 200 years, the title of Emir has been granted to a number of Bedouin Sheikhs by both Ottoman and French authorities in recognition of services to the government. Al-Fadl informants universally believe, however, that their Emir was one of the first tribal sheikhs to receive the title between 1199-1218. Sheikh Fadl (Al-Faour 1968: 26) and Oppenheim (1939: 206) support this view.

3. Almost without exception when I asked the question, "Who are you" (Miin intu), the response was: "Nihna min rab'u Faour; Faour Emirna" or "Nihna min rab'u Milhem; Milhem Sheikhna" (We are from the herd [people] of Faour; Faour is our Emir or We are from the herd [people] of Milhem; Milhem is our Sheikh).

4. The higher degree of subdivision among the Al-Hassanna tribe is perhaps related to its larger size in relation to the Al-Fadl.

5. These allocations are in some respects similar to what Gluckman (1965: 91-94) calls "primary, secondary and tertiary estates of administration" where there is a "close association between landholding and political and kinship status in a hierarchy."



6. Conference of Hama 1925, Conference of Palmyra 1931.

7. Some land had been registered in the name of tribal leaders during the latter Ottoman period (e.g., Fed'aan and the Al-Fadl), but it was not a widespread policy.

8. Sheikhly *Beit* = the dominant *Beit*, having greater access to sources of wealth, provides the leadership of the tribe. Although succession need not be from father to son, it usually remains within the *Beit*.

9. A tent count in the Beqaa Valley showed approximately 200 tents for the Al-Hassanna and the Al-Fadl tribes. My sample consisted of 31 households.

10. This possible association between the Al-Fadl and the Mawali tribe is discussed in some detail by Glubb, Oppenheim, and Muller.

11. In fact, the Emir's visit to Beit Salih in 1973 on the occasion of my introduction to the tribe was, according to my informants, his first visit to them in ten years.

12. By the mid-1960s, a regular subsidy had been established for *Beit* Faour from the Saudi family.

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